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Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Bei der privaten Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter entscheiden Individuen über ihren 
freiwilligen Beitrag zu einem gemeinsamen Projekt oder – analog – sie einigen sich auf ein 
gemeinsames Bereitstellungsniveau in Verbindung mit einer Regel zur Lastenverteilung. 
Diese Entscheidungsfindung ist besonders dann schwierig, wenn die Akteure neben 
Freifahreranreizen über unterschiedliche Interessen aufgrund heterogener individueller 
Präferenzen verfügen. Ein wichtiges Beispiel für dieses Problem ist die Debatte über eine 
gerechte Lastenverteilung bei der Emissionsreduktion in der internationalen Klimapolitik. 
Das Ziel dieses Papiers ist es, experimentell zu untersuchen, inwieweit unterschiedliche 
Regeln zur Lastenverteilung das gemeinsame, von jedem Akteur akzeptierte, 
Bereitstellungsniveau eines öffentlichen Guts beeinflussen. Dabei fokussiert sich die 
Fragestellung auf regelbasierte Beitragsmechanismen, welche sich aus dem Prinzip des 
kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenners ableiten lassen: Das Minimum aller Vorschläge über einen 
individuellen Beitrag zum gemeinsamen Projekt bildet dabei eine untere Grenze für die 
anschließende Beitragsentscheidung. Dieses Prinzip spiegelt sich in vielen internationalen 
Verhandlungen wider: Alle Teilnehmer müssen eine entsprechende Vereinbarungen 
unterschreiben und ratifizieren, bevor diese in Kraft tritt und bindend für sie ist. Dabei ist der 
Vorschlag mit dem kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner oftmals ausschlaggebend. 
In einem Laborexperiment werden verschiedene Minimum-Beitragsregeln auf Basis des 
Prinzips des kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenners in einem Öffentlichen-Gut-Spiel getestet und 
verglichen. Die Agenten unterscheiden sich in ihrem Nutzen aus dem gemeinsamen Projekt. 
Die experimentelle Anordnung ermöglicht dabei einen Vergleich von Regeln, die die 
Koordination der gesamten Gruppe verlangen, mit Mechanismen, welche eine Koordination 
unter jeweils gleichen Spielern vorsehen. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sämtliche Minimum-Beitragsregeln den Gewinn der Spieler 
gegenüber der Standardanordnung, in der das öffentliche Gut ohne zusätzliche Regeln nur 
durch freiwillige Beiträge aller Spieler bereitgestellt wird, signifikant erhöhen. 
Hervorzuheben ist dabei, dass im Vergleich zu allen anderen untersuchten Mechanismen eine 
Regel, welche die Gewinne der heterogenen Spieler durch unterschiedliche 
Beitragsforderungen ausgleicht, zumindest einige Akteure besser und niemand schlechter 
stellt. Dieses empirische Resultat lässt vermuten, dass eine entsprechende Regel zur 
Lastenaufteilung in der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter, welche alle Spieler miteinbezieht 
und explizite Umverteilungsmechanismen berücksichtigt, erhebliche Kooperationsgewinne 
realisieren kann. Diese Erkenntnisse tragen damit zur Erforschung effizienter institutioneller 
Rahmenbedingungen für die private Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter bei und liefern 
gleichzeitig einen Beitrag zur derzeitigen Diskussion in der internationalen Klimapolitik über 
alternative Möglichkeiten zur Ausgestaltung eines Kyoto Nachfolgeabkommens.   
Non-technical Summary 
The provision of public goods often faces the problem that agents need to voluntarily decide 
on their own contributions or – alternatively – have to agree upon some desired provision 
level of the public good in combination with a specific burden sharing rule. This challenge is 
particularly demanding, when, in addition to enforcement problems, interests differ among 
players due to heterogeneous preferences. International climate policy is an important 
example. While strong free-riding incentives prevent a pure voluntary and uncoordinated 
solution, international negotiations are loaded with debates on equity issues, i.e. on what 
constitutes a fair distribution of a global reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions.  
In this paper, we investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the provision level of a 
public good that all agents voluntarily accept. We focus on different rule-based contribution 
mechanisms that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents 
can suggest a minimum provision level of the public good that is allocated across agents 
according to some predetermined rule. The minimum of all proposals, i.e. the lowest common 
denominator, then takes effect and creates a “lower bound” for the individual contribution 
levels. This approach reflects many real world institutional arrangements that either involve a 
simultaneous choice of provision goal and burden sharing, or sequentially try to first 
determine the burden sharing rule before then deciding upon the provision goal. Since each 
participating country needs to sign and ratify the agreement, the player with the smallest 
proposal is pivotal. Countries can, however, voluntarily go beyond their obligations.  
We experimentally compare the ability of different rule-based contribution schemes to 
overcome the inefficiency in public good provision. Players differ with respect to their 
benefits from the public good, each group consists of two low-type and two high-type agents. 
Our results indicate that all rule-based contribution schemes significantly increase both payoff 
levels relative to the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. Interestingly, the equal-
payoff rule Pareto-dominates all other rules. This finding is particularly surprising since all 
rules are predicted to generate coordination on efficient, but differing allocations. Explicitly 
addressing redistribution among heterogeneous players by equalizing payoffs performs best 
due to substantially higher contributions from high-type players. This holds in particular 
relative to the scheme where high- and low-type players separately can determine their 
minimum contribution: here, low-type agents end up contributing at the same rate as in the 
equal-payoff treatment while high-type agents fail to efficiently coordinate. 
Our results lend insights not only into efficient institutional design for voluntary private 
provision of public goods, but may also inform the recent climate policy debate on whether to 
have small agreements among more homogeneous players instead of having one 
comprehensive Kyoto style agreement that creates complicated burden sharing issues. 
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1. Introduction 
The provision of public goods often faces the problem that agents need to voluntarily decide 
on their own contributions or – alternatively – have to agree upon some desired provision 
level of the public good in combination with a specific burden sharing rule. This challenge is 
particularly demanding, when, in addition to enforcement problems, interests differ among 
players due to heterogeneous preferences. International climate policy is an important 
example. While strong free-riding incentives prevent a pure voluntary and uncoordinated 
solution, international negotiations are loaded with debates on equity issues, i.e. on what 
constitutes a fair distribution of a global reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., 
Nordhaus 2010).  
In this paper, we investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the provision level of a 
public good that all agents voluntarily accept. We focus on different rule-based contribution 
mechanisms that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents 
can suggest a minimum provision level of the public good that is allocated across agents 
according to some predetermined rule. The minimum of all proposals, i.e. the lowest common 
denominator, then takes effect and creates a “lower bound” for the individual contribution 
levels.  
This approach reflects many real world institutional arrangements that involve either a 
simultaneous or a sequential choice of provision goal and burden sharing rule. For the climate 
policy example, a pre-negotiated rule, e.g. using uniform obligations among countries (Barrett 
2003), may particularly be beneficial in reducing negotiation costs when the total target 
changes over time. Since each participating country needs to sign and ratify the agreement, 
the player with the smallest proposal is pivotal. Countries can, however, voluntarily go 
beyond their obligations. Similar burden sharing rules can apply to individual decisions on 
voluntary public good provision. In the literature, the interaction of burden sharing has been 
discussed within the concept of Lindahl prices (Silvestre 1984, Sato 1987), where the 
outcome is given when no agent would desire reducing the public-good provision 
simultaneously with his own individual contribution to the public good (see van den 
Nouweland et al. 2002, Bilodeau and Gravel 2004). We contribute to the literature by 
experimentally comparing the ability of different rule-based contribution schemes to 
overcome the inefficiency in public good provision. 
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Our paper relates to the vibrant literature on the voluntary provision of public goods. Orzen 
(2008) and Dannenberg et al. (2010) have already shown the benefits from such a least 
common denominator rule when agents are homogeneous. It may not be surprising that these 
authors find that often this mechanism allows groups to reach large provision levels, thereby 
generating substantial welfare gains relative to the voluntary contribution mechanism, as 
players have a weakly dominant strategy to suggest an efficient provision and the only fair 
burden sharing rule allocates the same burden to all players. However, cooperation in many 
settings faces the challenge of substantially differing interests, for example due to different 
wealth or costs and benefits from the public good. Our paper explores the performance of 
rule-based contribution schemes for heterogeneous agents. We thereby focus on differences in 
the agents’ benefits from the public good. 
There is a significant literature on voluntary public good provision when players are 
heterogeneous. Many papers concentrate on endowment heterogeneity. Ledyard (1995) and 
Zelmer (2003) each review several experimental studies and find a negative impact of 
endowment heterogeneity on contributions.1 Spraggon and Oxoby (2009) show endowment 
effects to be sensitive to the endowments’ origin. In our experiment, we keep the endowment 
identical across agents, and rather concentrate on heterogeneous public good benefits.  
In their literature reviews, both Ledyard (1995) and Zelmer (2003) expose higher marginal 
per capita returns (MPCR) to enhance cooperation in public goods experiments. However, 
this effect does not necessarily remain robust if group members differ in their MPCRs. Fisher 
et al. (1995), for example, report only small tendencies low-type players (MPCR = 0.3) 
contributing more and high-type players (MPCR = 0.7) contributing less in heterogeneous 
settings in contrast to homogeneous groups. Tan (2008) shows that heterogeneity with respect 
to contributing costs lowers cooperation. Reuben and Riedl (2009) find that heterogeneity in 
endowments or benefits do not alter decision behavior if no punishment options exist. With 
punishment they investigate contribution norms based on different fairness principles. For 
instance, with unequal endowments or heterogeneous benefits, contributions are proportional 
to endowments or respectively to the ratio of marginal benefits. Fellner et al. (2011) 
investigate the impact of productivity isolated from the costs of contribution. They report that 
information about heterogeneity increases cooperation but alters contribution norms. While 
                                                          
1 Van Dijk et al. (2002) and Cherry et al. (2005) as well as Anderson et al. (2008) also confirm the negative 
endowment effect. In contrast, Chan et al. (1996, 1999) and Buckley and Croson (2006) show potential positive 
effects. Recent studies on this topic include Sadrieh and Verbon (2006), Koukoumelis et al. (2010) and 
Georgantzis and Proestakis (2011). 
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less information leads to more equal contributions, in case of full information subjects focus 
on group efficiency. Considering an endogenous coalition formation to provide public goods, 
McGinty et al. (forthcoming) focus on different distribution rules for coalition payoffs among 
heterogeneous players and find that efficiency substantially depends on the rule for division of 
coalitions’ benefits. 
In this paper, we experimentally test and compare several rule-based contribution schemes 
that are based on the lowest common denominator rule. We consider a linear repeated four-
person public good game with players that differ in their benefits from the joint project. Each 
group consists of two high-type players (MPCR = 0.7) and two low-type players 
(MPCR = 0.3). We compare the traditional VCM with four other treatments that differ in the 
implemented burden sharing rule: (i) two variants of equal minimum contribution 
requirements for all players, (ii) separated minimum levels for low- and high-type players, 
and (iii) a burden sharing rule aiming at equalizing payoffs of all players. The first rule 
thereby equally distributes the contribution obligation on all players and thereby extends the 
smallest common denominator rule (Orzen 2008, Dannenberg et al. 2010) to a heterogeneous 
player setting. The second rule allows both types of players to separately implement minimum 
contribution requirements that are only binding for players of their own type. This treatment is 
inspired by proposals in international climate policy negotiations to have small agreements 
among more homogeneous players rather than creating the problem of complicated discussion 
on burden sharing rules when all countries try to agree on a comprehensive treaty as in the 
Kyoto process (Olmstead and Stavins 2006). The third rule exogenously determines a 
differentiated burden regime that is inspired by calls for reducing payoff inequalities. 
Our results indicate that all rule-based contribution schemes significantly increase both payoff 
levels relative to the VCM. Interestingly, the equal-payoff rule Pareto-dominates all other 
rules. This finding is particularly surprising since all rules are predicted to generate efficient, 
but differing allocations. Explicitly addressing redistribution among heterogeneous players by 
equalizing payoffs performs best due to substantially higher contributions from high-type 
players. This holds in particular relative to the scheme where high- and low-type players 
separately can determine their minimum contribution: here, low-type agents end up 
contributing at the same rate as in the equal-payoff treatment while high-type agents fail to 
reach similar contribution levels. This result thereby indicates an important caveat of the 
smallest common denominator rule: differently from Orzen (2008) and Dannenberg et al. 
(2010), even homogeneous agents may fail to achieve efficient outcomes in presence of 
players with other characteristics. We therefore find a superiority of appropriately designed 
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rule-based contribution schemes that involve all players rather than having separate schemes 
for players of the same type.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short theoretical 
framework in order to derive the predictions for our experiment. The experimental design is 
described in section 3. We discuss our results in section 4, before concluding in section 5.  
 
2. Theoretical Predictions  
In our experiment, we consider different institutions by which agents may decide upon the 
provision of a public good. They include a standard voluntary provision mechanism (VCM) 
as well as different rule-based contribution schemes. In these, players first are either requested 
to suggest a desired total provision level, whose costs are then allocated across the agents 
according to differing burden sharing rules or subjects make suggestions for individual 
minimum contributions from which a lower bound on contribution is derived. 
The payoff structure in all treatments is given by a linear public good game. That is, the 
payoff to player i is given by 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒 − 𝑞𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑄 
where 𝑒 denotes the initial endowment, 𝑞𝑖 the individual contribution, 𝑏𝑖 the marginal benefit 
from the public good to player 𝑖, and 𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑗𝑛𝑗=1  the total provision level of the public good. 
Players differ with respect to their marginal benefits from the public good only. As standard, 
we assume that 𝑏𝑖 < 1 and ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 > 1. In our experiment, we consider groups of four 
players (𝑛 = 4) that consist of two low-type players (𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 0.3) and two high-type players 
(𝑏ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = 0.7). The endowment is given by 𝑒 = 20 such that 𝑞𝑖  ∈ [0,20]. 
 
Voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) 
In the traditional VCM, individuals simultaneously choose their contribution level 𝑞𝑖. Since 
𝑏𝑖 < 1 for all agents, individual utility maximization yields the Nash equilibrium of zero 
contributions to the public good both for low- and high-type players with individual earnings 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒. 
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Common individual minimum contribution mechanism (min-I-q) 
We next consider a setting in which all subjects first simultaneously suggest a common 
individual minimum contribution level. After these minimum proposals 𝑞𝑖min are received 
from all agents, this rule requires all four players to provide at least the smallest suggested 
level, i.e. 𝑞𝑖 ≥ 𝑞min = min𝑗  𝑞𝑗min. Under these conditions, each agent has a weakly dominant 
strategy to suggest 𝑞𝑖min = 𝑒: in the second stage, no payoff maximizing player would 
contribute more than required (𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞min). When making their minimum proposal 𝑞𝑖min in the 
first stage, agents therefore need to recognize their potential impact on the provision levels of 
all other players such by suggesting a higher minimum they can only increase their own 
payoff (𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒 − 𝑞min + 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑞min) since 𝑛𝑏𝑖 > 1. We therefore predict 𝑞𝑖min = 𝑒 such that an 
efficient outcome results (𝜋𝑖  = 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒7T).  
 
Separate individual minimum contribution mechanism (min-II-q) 
In the next treatment, we consider a modification to min-I-q in which the high- and low-type 
players may suggest an individual minimum contribution level that applies only to their own 
type. This treatment incorporates the idea that a forced equal contribution obligation that is 
implicitly present in min-I-q may not be acceptable when agents are heterogeneous. Rather, 
differentiated obligations for the respective player types are possible. That is, low-type 
players agree on their own binding minimum level 𝑞𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛 and high-type players choose 𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛 . 
Again, the smallest suggested level is binding for the respective type. Theory predicts full 
contribution if 1 < (𝑛
2
)𝑏𝑖 which holds only for the high-type players. Low-type players have a 
dominant strategy of suggesting 𝑞𝑖min = 0. The payoffs are therefore predicted as 𝜋𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ  =
𝑏ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑛2)𝑒7T and 𝜋𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑤  = 𝑒(1 + (𝑛2)𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑤). Note that this allocation is efficient: since we 
assumed that no direct transfers are possible, no other allocation exists that treats agents of the 
same type identically and generates a larger payoff to all players. 
The two treatments min-I-q and min-II-q rely on a minimum mechanism in which players can 
suggest an individual contribution level. We next consider contributions schemes in which all 
players suggest a total provision level 𝑄 that is distributed across agents to a specific rule such 
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that 𝑞𝑖 ≥ 𝛼𝑖𝑄 where ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 1.2 We define such schemes as follows: In a first step, each 
agent can suggest a total provision level 𝑄𝑖. The minimum of the suggested levels is then 
decisive for contributions in the second stage: 𝑄min = min𝑗 𝑄𝑗 such that 𝑞𝑖 ≥ 𝛼𝑖𝑄min. In the 
second stage, players again have no incentive to contribute more than required, i.e. 𝑞𝑖 =
𝛼𝑖𝑄
min. The payoff is therefore given by 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒 − 𝛼𝑖𝑄min + 𝑏𝑖𝑄min such that agents have a 
weakly dominant strategy to suggest the maximal possible 𝑄𝑖 if 𝛼𝑖 ≤ 𝑏𝑖, while suggesting 
𝑄𝑖 = 0 is dominant if 𝛼𝑖 > 𝑏𝑖. 
The strategic features of min-I-q coincide with a setting in which 𝛼𝑖 = 1/𝑛, that is an 
egalitarian burden sharing rule. The predictions in min-II-q coincide with a setting in which 
𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 0 and 𝛼ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = 2𝑛 = 12 , that is a rule that allocates the burden only to high-type players.  
 
Equal contribution treatment (min-I-Q) 
In our experiment, we introduce a treatment min-I-Q with 𝛼𝑖 = 1/𝑛 in order to control for 
framing effects. As in min-I-q, the predictions are 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑛𝑒, with 𝜋𝑖  = 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒. 
 
Equal payoff treatment (min-I-Q-eq) 
We further consider a burden sharing rule that is motivated by reaching equal payoffs. That is, 
the 𝛼𝑖   values are determined such that the predicted payoff: 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒 + (𝑏𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑄 
is identical for all players 𝑖. In general, this implies that 
𝛼𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖 − 1𝑛 �� 𝑏𝑗𝑗 − 1� 
which in our experiment would require 𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 0.05 = 0.3 − (2 − 1)/4 and 𝛼ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = 0.45 =0.7 − (2 − 1)/4. Note, however, payoff equality can only be reached if 𝛼ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑒, or 
𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 20/0.45 = 44.4. In our experiment, we therefore distribute the burden for 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 >
                                                          
2 For the sake of allowing the reader to better follow the remainder of the paper, we would like to explain the 
notation of our treatments: it indicates whether the treatment implements a minimum threshold (“min” in all 
treatments except VCM), whether the individual contribution requirement is based on one or two separate 
minimum thresholds (“I” in min-I-q, min-I-Q, min-I-Q-eq, “II” in min-II-q), and whether subjects propose an 
individual contribution level qimin or a total level Qimin (“q” in min-I-q, min-II-q, “Q” in min-I-Q, min-I-Q-eq). 
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20/0.45 such that the high-type players contribute all their endowment, while allocating a 
minimum contribution of (𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 40)/2 to low-type players. 
Given the parameters in our experiment, high-type players again have a weakly dominant 
strategy to suggest a group minimum contribution level of  𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 80 which would lead to 
unequal payoffs for both players. As low-type players only gain as long an increase in 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 
also lead to increased burden to high-type players, i.e. as long as 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 20/0.45 = 44.4, 
they are predicted to suggest 𝑄𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 44. 
Our predictions are summarized in Table 1. Figure 3 illustrates the predicted payoffs to low- 
and high-type players under VCM (point A), min-I-Q and min-I-q (Point B), min-II-q (point 
C), and min-I-Q-eq (Point D), as well as the line of all efficient allocations that give equal 
payoff to players of same type (line connecting B and C). Note that all rule-based contribution 
schemes that we consider lead to efficient outcomes (under the assumption that no direct 
transfers are feasible between agents). That is, no rule is predicted to dominate another. We 
will test these predictions in our experiment. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
The experiment was run in November 2011 at the MaXLab laboratory of the University of 
Magdeburg in Germany. We recruited 336 students from various disciplines. Each student 
took part in one of 14 sessions with 24 subjects each.3 On average, a session lasted about 60 
minutes. At the beginning of each session, subjects were seated at separated linked computer 
terminals. We used z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007) for programming and ORSEE (Greiner 
2004) for recruiting. In each session, we randomly created six groups of four players with two 
high-type and two low-type players. Subjects were not aware of their exact partners. Each 
player remained the same type in the same group throughout the whole experiment (partner 
matching). All relevant information on players’ type (high-type player or low-type player), 
contributions (tokens) and payoffs (in Labdollars LD) was transmitted via screen. No direct 
communication between participants was allowed, only the four players of one group received 
full information on offers, decisions and payoffs within their group on their screens. In a first 
step, subjects received a set of experimental instructions which included verbal descriptions, 
numerical examples and control questions to make sure that every participant understood the 
                                                          
3 Due to a typing error in our z-tree program, we had to remove the results of one group of four players in the 
first session from our analysis. 
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game.4 In a second step, the experiment was started on the computer. A session consisted of 
12 rounds, the first two being practice periods. At the end of each session, one non-practice 
round was randomly chosen to determine individual earnings for each player. The exchange 
rate between Euro and LabDollar (LD) was 1:2.5. On average, subjects earned about 11 Euro. 
No additional show-up fee was paid. The experimental design is summarized in Table 2. 
 
4. Experimental Results 
Our experimental design enables us, on the one hand, to test our theoretical predictions 
regarding public good contribution levels under heterogeneity across different mechanisms. 
On the other hand, we may observe “pattern” of individual behavior and, thus, develop a 
better understanding which mechanisms perform best when heterogeneous individuals have 
the option to contribute to a public good. We craft our results both by pooling the data across 
all ten periods and by reporting the results in the last five periods. We later explore the effects 
of time on contribution schedules in more detail. 
Table 3 provides mean contribution levels for each of our treatments and Figure 1 provides a 
graphical depiction of the data. Averaged over all periods, contributions are lowest in VCM 
(5.5 tokens) and highest in the equal-payoff treatment min-I-Q-eq (9.4). These differences are 
even more pronounced when concentrating on the last five periods (VCM 3.9, min-I-Q-eq 
9.9). While a comparison of contributions is indicative of the obtained efficiency, we first 
focus on the payoff comparisons across treatments. In our discussion, we hereby concentrate 
on the last five periods. All results are, however, also reported for all ten periods in Table 4. 
We first establish the following result on the benefits of rule-based contribution schemes: 
 
Result 1. 
Rule-based contribution schemes lead to larger payoffs than VCM. 
 
Focusing on the last 5 periods, average profit over all players is minimal in VCM (23.91 LD) 
and reaches its maximum in min-I-Q-eq (29.91 LD). Hereby, average payoffs are significantly 
larger under all rules than under VCM (p < 0.05 for min-I-q, p < 0.01 for all other rules).5 
                                                          
4 We provide an example of instructions and screenshots in the Appendix. 
5 In this section, we refer to exact two-sided Mann-Whitney U (MW U) tests with the average contribution by 
one group or subgroup (high-type or low-type) as the unit of observation.  
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These benefits accrue in particular to high-type agents (p < 0.01 in all treatments relative to 
VCM), while low-types benefit particularly in treatments that differentiate the burden 
(p < 0.01, min-II-q, min-I-Q-eq relative to VCM), while not significantly doing better in 
treatments that require identical contributions from all players (min-I-q and min-I-Q).  
These results on payoff comparisons are confirmed by a series of random-effects regression 
models6 (see Table 5). Average profits over all players and periods are significantly higher in 
all treatments than in VCM except in min-I-q (at least p < 0.10 for all other rules) (column 1). 
This average treatment effect is largest for min-I-Q-eq.7 The benefits of rule-based provision 
of public goods relative to VCM particularly occur over time. While we confirm the standard 
result that average contributions in VCM decline significantly over time, regression results 
suggest the downward trends to be weaker in all other treatments (column 2). In min-I-Q-eq, 
average contributions are even increasing over time (p < 0.05). A closer look indicates 
differences in payoffs between the two types because of higher benefits for high-type players 
in all treatments (p < 0.01) (column 3). Focusing on the last five periods, these differences are 
most pronounced in min-I-q and min-I-Q where equal minima for all types are implemented 
(columns 4 and 5), while tendencies of payoff harmonization exist for rules that explicitly 
address the differentiation of burdens (min-II-q and min-I-Q-eq). Payoff gains for low-type 
agents are largest in min-I-Q-eq (p < 0.01). In min-I-q, they loose in contrast to VCM 
(p < 0.05). 
For low-type agents, profits in min-I-Q-eq are even increasing over time (p < 0.01). An 
additional downward trend for high-type agents relative to the trend for low-type players 
occurs in VCM and min-II-q. 
While Result 1 was expected under our theoretical predictions, it nicely adds to findings by 
Orzen (2008) and Dannenberg et al. (2010) who show the benefits from minimum-rules for 
homogeneous agents. We show that such minimum-contribution rules may also generate 
efficiency gains when agents differ significantly in their benefits from the public good. This 
even holds for rules that require equal contributions from all players. However, our results 
also indicate important benefits from differentiating the burden across players by accounting 
for their different benefits from the public good. In particular, we observe that low-type 
players obtain significantly larger payoffs under rules that do not require them to contribute at 
                                                          
6 This estimation procedure enables us to allow for unobserved subject-specific differences. We use a random-
effects Feasible Generalized Least Square estimator (RE FGLS) for determining differences in individual 
payoffs.  
7 Throughout the paper, the discussion on differences among estimated regression coefficients is based on 
underlying Wald Tests. 
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the same rate as high-type agents: min-II-q (24.45 LD) leads to larger payoffs than min-I-q 
(21.91 LD) and min-I-Q (22.06 LD); min-I-Q-eq (28.51 LD) leads to larger payoffs than any 
other rule (all differences significant, p < 0.01). While these profit gains for low-type agents 
hurt the high-type agents when comparing min-I-Q (32.10 LD) with min-II-q (29.14 LD) 
(p < 0.05), also high-type agents benefit from the equal-payoff rule min-I-Q-eq (31.32 LD) 
(p < 0.01, compared with all rules besides min-I-Q). 
We therefore obtain the following result: 
 
Result 2. 
The equal-payoff rule Pareto-dominates all other burden sharing rules, including the VCM. 
 
Table 5 provides further evidence for this result. It should be noted that the benefits from min-
I-Q-eq relative to other treatments for low-type agents already accrue in the first five periods. 
The important difference, however, occurs over time as we have stated above. Average profits 
in all treatments tend to decrease over periods, except for min-I-Q-eq. In this treatment, profits 
for low-type subjects are increasing in the last 5 periods (p < 0.01). Our regression results 
suggest that this effect may be smaller for high-type players, but the difference is not 
significant. 
It should be noted, however, that almost no group chooses the efficient provision level that 
was predicted by the theory. Figure 3 plots average profits for high- and low-type players for 
each group in the last 5 periods. As stated in the previous section, the points B, C, and D 
denote the equilibrium payoffs that would be predicted under the respective burden sharing 
rules. Point A corresponds to the zero contributions as predicted for VCM. While significant 
profit gains relative to VCM predictions are realized, most groups do not come close to the 
Pareto frontier. For example, many groups in min-I-q and min-I-Q choose to contribute along 
the line AB towards the Pareto frontier, thereby suggesting that they did not contribute more 
than was demanded by the minimum rule, but only few groups came close to achieving 
efficiency. In min-II-q, only one group obtains contribution levels along AC, for all other 
groups low-type players contributed a positive amount and thereby benefited the high-type 
players more. For the payoff-equality rule in min-I-Q-eq (along AD) average efficiency gains 
were largest. In this treatment, many groups managed to come close to the efficiency frontier. 
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These payoff differences correspond to different contribution levels that can be observed in 
our random-effects regression models8 in Table 6a and 6b. Average contributions to the 
public good across all players and time periods in all treatments are higher than in VCM (at 
least p < 0.05 except for min-I-q), with the effect being strongest in min-I-Q-eq (columns 1). 
These treatment differences are particularly driven by different time trends: Overall, we 
observe a positive trend for min-I-Q-eq (at least p < 0.05), but declining average contributions 
for all other treatments (significant only for VCM at p < 0.01 in Table 6a (column 2), but for 
all other treatments in Table 6b (column 2)). The temporal trends can also be identified by 
looking at the underlying contribution decisions in Figure 1, it is easily seen that mean 
contributions do not differ across treatments in the first period. Figure 1 indicates that the 
contributions in all treatments, except min-I-Q-eq, are decreasing over time. The drop in 
contributions is strongest in VCM. The lower part of Figure 1 shows how both types 
contribute to these differences. Concentrating on low-type players (column 4 in Table 6a and 
6b), we observe that contributions decline over time in VCM and min-II-q, but are rather 
stable in the other treatments. The increases in average contributions relative to VCM in min-
II-q and in min-I-Q-eq are thereby largely driven by high-type players (columns 3 and 4). No 
difference exists between the contributions of low-type players between min-II-q and min-I-
Q-eq, while high-type players give significantly more in min-I-Q-eq. The downward time 
trend in min-II-q is significantly less pronounced for high-type players relative to low-type 
players, but in aggregate only leads to stable contributions of high-type players over time. In 
min-I-Q-eq, however, there is no clear statistical evidence for a downward trend for low-type 
players exists while contributions for high-type subjects are rising in the last 5 periods 
(p < 0.01). This increase in contributions by high-type players thereby drives the dominance 
of the equal-payoff rule as observed in Result 2.  
We can therefore formulate the following result that complements our previous results: 
 
                                                          
8 We follow our estimation strategy which we applied for determining differences in individual payoffs and use a 
random-effects Feasible Generalized Least Square estimator (RE FGLS) for analyzing individual contribution 
behavior. In addition, for robustness check, we further apply a Tobit estimator (RE Tobit). The latter estimator 
controls for the fact that the dependent variable (individual contributions to the public good in each period) is 
both left- and right-censored with a lower limit of 0 (20.12% of all contribution decisions) and an upper limit of 
20 (9.67% of all contribution decisions). Specification tests suggest that the results of the Tobit estimator are not 
sensitive to the number of quadrature points used in the estimation process. 
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Result 3. 
Contributions increase over time in min-I-Q-eq, but show a downward trend in all other 
treatments, particularly in VCM. For low-type players, there is no downward trend in min-I-q 
and min-I-Q, such that these treatments lead to higher contributions by low-type players in 
the last periods than the other treatments. For high-type players, contributions are largest in 
min-I-Q-eq and even increase over time. 
 
Result 3 already demonstrates different time trends for low- and high-type players: the 
dominance of min-I-Q-eq appears to be primarily driven by increased contributions by high-
type players themselves. They contribute 16.4 tokens on average in the last 5 periods in min-I-
Q-eq, while their contributions are significantly smaller in all other treatments (p < 0.01). 
Conversely, low-type agents contribute less in this treatment (3.4 tokens) than under any other 
non-differentiating rule-based scheme (5.7 in min-I-q, 6.2 in min-I-Q, p < 0.01). Interestingly, 
low-type agents’ contributions are not significantly different in min-II-q (3.7) than under the 
equal-payoff treatment. This implies that min-I-Q-eq allows high-type agents to come closer 
to their efficient contribution level than they do under the min-II-q treatment which also had 
predicted the two high-type players to contribute their full endowment. Instead, they only 
achieve an average 9.9 tokens in this treatment. 
These lower contribution levels are primarily driven by the lower minimum proposals. In fact, 
only 3 out of 18 groups of high-type players in min-II-q achieve a binding minimum proposal 
of at least 18 in period 10. Seven groups of high-type players do not achieve any cooperation, 
i.e. stay at a zero level in period 10. In contrast, 14 out of 18 groups in min-I-Q-eq achieve a 
total provision level of the public good that requires high-type players to contribute at least 18 
in period 10. Considering only the minimum proposals by high-type players, all 18 groups of 
two would suggest to take on at least 18 tokens as obligation. In fact, 16 pairs of high-type 
players in min-I-Q-eq suggest provision levels in period 10 that would require them to 
contribute all 20 tokens. 
We therefore formulate the following result: 
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Result 4. 
An appropriately designed burden sharing scheme that involves all players allows high-type 
players to coordinate over time more effectively than a scheme under which players of the 
different types separately choose their binding minimum contribution levels. 
 
We consider Result 4 as being rather surprising: it is obvious that low-type agents under the 
equal-payoff scheme will suggest high provision levels up to 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 44  which would 
require almost full contribution of high-type subjects, but relatively little from low-type 
players (less than 3, see Table 1). Anticipating low-types’ payoff maximization behavior, 
high-type agents’ best answer is to suggest a minimum which is equal or higher than  𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 =44. Effectively, this scheme therefore should have similar effects as the min-II-q treatment 
where the two high-type players choose their binding contribution level only among 
themselves. However, we observe significantly less efficient choices in min-II-q which leads 
to the dominance of the equal-payoff rule.  
The missing cooperation among high-type players in min-II-q stands in conflict with findings 
by Orzen (2008) and Dannenberg et al. (2010) who show that homogenous groups achieve 
large cooperation levels under the lowest common denominator scheme. Our results therefore 
suggest that coordination is hampered when other, different-type players, are present.   
This difference in the decisions by high-type players in min-II-q and min-I-Q-eq is 
particularly surprising as the contributions of low-type players do not differ between the two 
treatments. We can therefore only speculate about the reasons for this dominance of the equal-
payoff treatment: on the one hand, min-I-Q-eq may have intuitively appealing properties as it 
automatically equalizes payoffs. Our results can be rationalized when agents are sufficiently 
inequality-averse (compare Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Charness and Rabin 2002). On the other 
hand, efficiency may be improved in min-I-Q-eq since all players’ suggested minimum levels 
for the aggregate provision level are treated identically. Differently in min-II-q, each player 
type makes proposals that are treated separately. As a result, high-type players may be 
influenced by explicitly observing small minimum proposals from low-type players, while not 
recognizing that decoupling from those by coordinating only among themselves is optimal for 
the two high-type players. 
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5. Conclusions 
Forming institutions to secure the provision of global public goods is a complicated endeavor. 
In general, the success of a decentralized institution to provide a public good depends on two 
interlinked challenges: on the one hand, the institutional arrangements need to overcome free 
rider incentives. On the other hand, as soon as subjects are heterogeneous, any given 
institution has to cope with equity issues or equivalently the burden sharing of the total costs. 
In this paper, we tested different institutions with respect to their ability to succeed along 
these two dimensions. In particular, we investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the 
provision level of a public good that all agents voluntarily accept. We focus on different rule-
based contribution mechanisms that are based on the principle of the smallest common 
denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum provision level of the public good that is 
allocated across agents according to some predetermined rule. The minimum of all proposals, 
i.e. the lowest common denominator, then creates a threshold for the own contribution. We 
introduced heterogeneity as our players differ with respect to their marginal benefit from the 
public good.  
Our results indicate that rule-based contribution schemes significantly increase payoff levels 
relative to the voluntary contribution mechanism. Interestingly, the equal-payoff rule where 
the minimum threshold is chosen in a way that payoffs are equalized Pareto-dominates all 
other rules. This finding is particularly surprising since all rules are predicted to generate 
efficient, but differing allocations. Enforcing redistribution among heterogeneous players by 
equalizing payoffs performs best due to substantially higher contributions from high-type 
players. This holds in particular relative to the scheme where high- and low-type players 
separately can determine their minimum contribution: here, low-type agents end up 
contributing at the same rate as in the equal-payoff treatment while high-type agents fail to 
choose their predicted efficient minimum contribution level. This result may shed some light 
on the recent discussion in climate policy. In order to accelerate negotiations for a post-Kyoto 
agreement sub-agreements between rather homogenous countries are suggested. In our 
environment, these sub-agreements fail to produce efficiency. Instead, subjects with high 
marginal benefit contribute at a significantly higher level only when they know that the 
redistribution is explicitly enforced by the mechanisms. 
Compared to the equal payoff-rule the performance of the single (“one for all”) smallest 
common denominator rule in our experiment is rather weak. While recent experiments have 
shown that this rule is quite successful under homogeneous players, we get a different picture 
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under heterogeneity. This result underlines the importance of equity in the provision of public 
goods and of robustness checks for mechanisms under various conditions. Other aspects of 
heterogeneity such as heterogeneous costs, endowments or ways to generate the endowment 
(“house money effects”) may alter the relative performance of the studied rule-based 
mechanisms. The experimental investigation of such heterogeneities on the performance of 
the different institutions and their possible adjustments are fruitful areas of further research. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Summary of predictions with standard preferences 
 𝑞𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑞𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ  𝜋𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝜋𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ Π 𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙 
VCM 0 0 20 20 80 20 
min-I-q 20 20 24 56 160 40 
min-II-q 0 20 32 28 120 30 
min-I-Q 20 20 24 56 160 40 
min-I-Q-eq 2.2 19.8 31 31 124 31 
 
Table 2: Summary of experimental design 
Treatment Stages Separated minimum rules for low-
type and high-type players 
n bi No. of subjects 
(ind. obs.) 
VCM contribution  4 𝑏𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑤  = 0.3 
𝑏𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ= 0.7 48 (12) 
min-I-q minimum 
contribution 
no 4 𝑏𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑤  = 0.3 
𝑏𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ= 0.7 72 (18) 
min-II-q minimum 
contribution 
yes 4 𝑏𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑤  = 0.3 
𝑏𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ= 0.7 72 (18) 
min-I-Q minimum 
contribution 
no 4 𝑏𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑤  = 0.3 
𝑏𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ= 0.7 68 (17) 
min-I-Q-eq minimum 
contribution 
yes 4 𝑏𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑤  = 0.3 
𝑏𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ= 0.7 72 (18) 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics for all treatments 
Treatment 𝑞𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑞𝑙𝑜𝑤  𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ  𝑞𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝜋𝑙𝑜𝑤  𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ  𝜋𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 Π 𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙 
 All periods 
VCM 5.5 3.2 7.7 2.41 23.33 27.59 1.18 101.84 25.46 
min-I-q 6.4 5.8 7.3 1.26 22.05 31.10 1.41 106.29 26.57 
min-II-q 7.2 4.5 9.9 2.20 24.13 30.21 1.25 108.68 27.17 
min-I-Q 7.4 6.3 8.4 1.33 22.54 32.37 1.44 109.28 27.32 
min-I-Q-eq 9.4 3.6 15.1 4.19 27.65 31.02 1.12 117.34 29.34 
 Periods 1-5 
VCM 7.0 4.4 9.6 2.18 23.97 30.05 1.25 108.05 27.01 
min-I-q 6.8 5.9 7.6 1.29 22.19 31.35 1.41 107.07 26.77 
min-II-q 7.6 5.2 9.9 1.90 23.82 31.27 1.31 110.17 27.54 
min-I-Q 7.9 6.4 9.3 1.45 23.01 32.64 1.42 111.29 27.82 
min-I-Q-eq 8.8 3.7 13.8 3.73 26.79 30.73 1.15 115.04 28.76 
 Periods 6-10 
VCM 3.9 2.0 5.8 2.90 22.69 25.13 1.11 95.63 23.91 
min-I-q 6.4 5.7 7.0 1.23 21.91 30.85 1.41 105.51 26.38 
min-II-q 6.8 3.7 9.9 2.68 24.45 29.14 1.19 107.19 26.80 
min-I-Q 6.9 6.2 7.5 1.21 22.06 32.10 1.46 107.26 26.82 
min-I-Q-eq 9.9 3.4 16.4 4.82 28.51 31.32 1.10 119.65 29.91 
Notes: 𝑞𝑎𝑙𝑙 R = average contribution per group, 𝑞𝑙𝑜𝑤 R = average contributions for low-type, 𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = average 
contributions for high-type, 𝑞𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 R = 𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ/𝑞𝑙𝑜𝑤, 𝜋𝑙𝑜𝑤= average profits for low-type, 𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = average profits for 
high-type, 𝜋𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ/𝜋𝑙𝑜𝑤 , Π = sum of profits for all players, 𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙 R = average profit per group. 
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Table 4: Tests between treatments (MW U test) 
Treatment VCM min-I-q min-II-q min-I-Q VCM min-I-q min-II-q min-I-Q 
qi all players Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
min-I-q >    >**    
min-II-q > >   >*** >   
min-I-Q > > >  >*** > >  
min-I-Q-eq >*** >** >*** >* >*** >*** >*** >*** 
 
Treatment VCM min-I-q min-II-q min-I-Q VCM min-I-q min-II-q min-I-Q 
qlow Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
min-I-q **    >***    
min-II-q > <   >*** <***   
min-I-Q >** > >*  >*** > >***  
min-I-Q-eq > <** < <*** >*** <*** < <*** 
 
Treatment VCM min-I-q min-II-q min-I-Q VCM min-I-q min-II-q min-I-Q 
qhigh Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
min-I-q <    >    
min-II-q > >*   >*** >***   
min-I-Q > > <  > > <***  
min-I-Q-eq >*** >*** >*** >*** >*** >*** >*** >*** 
 
Treatment VCM min-I-q min-II-q min-I-Q VCM min-I-q min-II-q min-I-Q 
π i all players Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
min-I-q >    >**    
min-II-q > >   >*** >   
min-I-Q > > >  >*** > >  
min-I-Q-eq >** >** >*** >* >*** >*** >*** >*** 
 
Treatment VCM min-I-q min-II-q min-I-Q VCM min-I-q min-II-q min-I-Q 
π low Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
min-I-q <    <    
min-II-q > >***   >*** >***   
min-I-Q < > <**  < > <***  
min-I-Q-eq >*** >*** >*** >*** >*** >*** >*** >*** 
 
Treatment VCM min-I-q min-II-q min-I-Q VCM min-I-q min-II-q min-I-Q 
πhigh Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
min-I-q >    >***    
min-II-q > <   >*** <   
min-I-Q >** > >  >*** > >**  
min-I-Q-eq >** < > < >*** >*** >*** < 
Note: We compare rows with columns. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Random-effects regression of profit levels for all treatments 
 (1) 
All per. 
(2) 
All per. 
(3) 
All per. 
(4) 
All per. 
(5) 
Last 5 per. 
VARIABLES Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit 
      
min_I_q 1.112 -0.246 -2.642*** -1.787** -0.781 
 (0.995) (1.118) (0.792) (0.747) (0.542) 
min_II_q 1.709* 0.529 -0.378 -0.157 1.761** 
 (0.911) (1.115) (0.780) (0.747) (0.733) 
min_I_Q 1.991* 0.811 -1.976** -0.962 -0.630 
 (1.016) (1.238) (0.873) (0.748) (0.611) 
min_I_Q_eq 3.876*** 1.747* 2.185*** 2.813*** 5.815*** 
 (0.778) (0.993) (0.770) (0.750) (0.642) 
per6_10_VCM  -3.104*** -3.104*** -1.283***  
  (0.637) (0.638) (0.392)  
per6_10_min_I_q  -0.389 -0.389 -0.278  
  (0.659) (0.660) (0.381)  
per6_10_min_II_q  -0.744 -0.744 0.634  
  (0.495) (0.495) (0.522)  
per6_10_min_I_Q  -0.744 -0.744 -0.952**  
  (0.948) (0.949) (0.393)  
per6_10_min_I_Q_eq  1.154** 1.154** 1.719***  
  (0.523) (0.523) (0.503)  
high_VCM   4.257*** 6.078*** 2.437** 
   (1.028) (1.320) (1.024) 
high_min_I_q   9.049*** 9.160*** 8.938*** 
   (1.178) (1.151) (1.525) 
high_min_II_q   6.071*** 7.450*** 4.692*** 
   (1.175) (1.300) (1.229) 
high_min_I_Q   9.831*** 9.624*** 10.04*** 
   (1.129) (1.500) (1.451) 
high_min_I_Q_eq   3.381*** 3.945*** 2.816*** 
   (0.912) (1.104) (0.993) 
high_per6_10_VCM    -3.642***  
    (1.162)  
high_per6_10_min_I_q    -0.222  
    (1.320)  
high_per6_10_min_II_q    -2.758***  
    (0.936)  
high_per6_10_min_I_Q    0.415  
    (1.899)  
high_per6_10_min_I_Q_eq    -1.129  
    (1.039)  
Constant 25.46*** 27.01*** 24.88*** 23.97*** 22.69*** 
 (0.598) (0.792) (0.607) (0.577) (0.473) 
      
Observations 3,320 3,320 3,320 3,320 1,660 
R-sq 0.0253 0.0334 0.2453 0.2494 0.2419 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Definition of variables  
qi Subject’s contribution 
Profit Subject’s payoff 
min_I_q =1 if subject played treatment min-I-q, 0 otherwise 
min_II_q =1 if subject played treatment min-II-q, 0 otherwise 
min_I_Q =1 if subject played treatment min-I-Q, 0 otherwise 
min_I_Q_eq =1 if subject played treatment min-I-Q-eq, 0 otherwise 
per6_10_*treatment* =1 for the last 5 periods and subject played *treatment*, 0 otherwise 
high_*treatment* =1 if subject played *treatment* and is a high-type, 0 otherwise 
high_per6_10_*treatment* =1 for the last 5 periods and subject is a high-type and subject played *treatment*, 0 
otherwise 
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Table 6a: FGLS Random-effects regression of contributions to the public good  
 (1) 
All per. 
(2) 
All per. 
(3) 
All per. 
(4) 
All per. 
(5) 
Last 5 per. 
VARIABLES qi qi qi qi qi 
      
min_I_q 1.112 -0.246 1.260 1.492* 3.744*** 
 (0.793) (0.912) (0.859) (0.895) (0.969) 
min_II_q 1.709** 0.529 0.0687 0.792 1.706** 
 (0.851) (0.963) (0.953) (0.993) (0.846) 
min_I_Q 1.859** 0.811 2.002** 1.935* 4.165*** 
 (0.778) (0.980) (0.991) (1.085) (0.945) 
min_I_Q_eq 3.876*** 1.747 -1.792** -0.717 1.391* 
 (0.999) (1.069) (0.858) (0.908) (0.722) 
per6_10_VCM  -3.104*** -3.104*** -2.442***  
  (0.520) (0.520) (0.617)  
per6_10_min_I_q  -0.389 -0.389 -0.189  
  (0.542) (0.543) (0.754)  
per6_10_min_II_q  -0.744 -0.744 -1.528***  
  (0.508) (0.508) (0.425)  
per6_10_min_I_Q  -1.009 -1.009 -0.212  
  (0.787) (0.788) (0.999)  
per6_10_min_I_Q_eq  1.154** 1.154** -0.334  
  (0.552) (0.552) (0.490)  
high_VCM   4.479*** 5.142*** 3.817*** 
   (1.036) (1.266) (1.035) 
high_min_I_q   1.467 1.667 1.267 
   (0.998) (1.068) (1.201) 
high_min_II_q   5.400*** 4.617*** 6.183*** 
   (1.003) (1.124) (1.118) 
high_min_I_Q   2.097** 2.894** 1.300 
   (0.931) (1.253) (1.179) 
high_min_I_Q_eq   11.56*** 10.07*** 13.04*** 
   (0.800) (1.005) (0.905) 
high_per6_10_VCM    -1.325  
    (1.024)  
high_per6_10_min_I_q    -0.400  
    (1.085)  
high_per6_10_min_II_q    1.567  
    (1.000)  
high_per6_10_min_I_Q    -1.594  
    (1.565)  
high_per6_10_min_I_Q_eq    2.976***  
    (1.047)  
Constant 5.460*** 7.013*** 4.773*** 4.442*** 2*** 
 (0.610) (0.733) (0.594) (0.663) (0.454) 
      
Observations 3,320 3,320 3,320 3,320 1,660 
R-sq 0.0328 0.0439 0.2593 0.2637 0.3155 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6b: Tobit Random-effects regression of contributions to the public good  
 (1) 
All per. 
(2) 
All per. 
(3) 
All per. 
(4) 
All per. 
(5) 
Last 5 per. 
VARIABLES qi qi qi qi qi 
      
min_I_q 2.601** 0.696 2.860* 2.811* 7.062*** 
 (1.262) (1.316) (1.487) (1.530) (1.817) 
min_II_q 3.152** 1.544 0.875 1.666 3.789** 
 (1.262) (1.317) (1.491) (1.534) (1.824) 
min_I_Q 3.470*** 1.917 3.583** 3.158** 7.742*** 
 (1.277) (1.332) (1.507) (1.552) (1.835) 
min_I_Q_eq 6.738*** 3.608*** 0.0621 1.093 5.866*** 
 (1.263) (1.317) (1.487) (1.530) (1.811) 
per6_10_VCM  -4.919*** -4.861*** -4.737***  
  (0.623) (0.617) (0.907)  
per6_10_min_I_q  -0.790* -0.776* -0.582  
  (0.472) (0.469) (0.661)  
per6_10_min_II_q  -1.402*** -1.406*** -2.987***  
  (0.477) (0.475) (0.694)  
per6_10_min_I_Q  -1.504*** -1.491*** -0.536  
  (0.487) (0.485) (0.689)  
per6_10_min_I_Q_eq  1.640*** 1.655*** -0.320  
  (0.469) (0.469) (0.645)  
high_VCM   6.481*** 6.568*** 6.869*** 
   (1.586) (1.678) (1.980) 
high_min_I_q   1.941 2.124 1.988 
   (1.270) (1.350) (1.552) 
high_min_II_q   7.545*** 6.098*** 9.221*** 
   (1.274) (1.352) (1.560) 
high_min_I_Q   2.933** 3.847*** 1.899 
   (1.309) (1.392) (1.592) 
high_min_I_Q_eq   13.32*** 11.28*** 15.61*** 
   (1.272) (1.350) (1.555) 
high_per6_10_VCM    -0.215  
    (1.231)  
high_per6_10_min_I_q    -0.381  
    (0.933)  
high_per6_10_min_II_q    2.976***  
    (0.949)  
high_per6_10_min_I_Q    -1.859*  
    (0.963)  
high_per6_10_min_I_Q_eq    4.128***  
    (0.934)  
Constant 3.184*** 5.490*** 2.385** 2.346* -2.724* 
 (0.984) (1.025) (1.164) (1.197) (1.450) 
      
Observations 3,320 3,320 3,320 3,320 1,660 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
25 
 
Figure 1: Mean contributions over time 
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Figure 2: Mean profits over time 
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Figure 3: Profits per group (average over periods 6 to 10) 
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Experimental instructions for min-I-Q-eq treatment 
Instructions 
Welcome to the Magdeburg Experimental Laboratory MaXLab! 
Please read these instructions carefully and should you have any questions please signal us by 
opening the door or a show of hands. Please do not talk to other participants.  
In the laboratory experiment you are taking part in, you can win money depending on your 
decisions and the decisions of your fellow players. Your payout from the experiment will be 
calculated in LabDollars (LD). The conversion rate between € and LD is 1:2.5, i.e. 1 LD are 
0.40 €. All your decisions made in the experiment will remain anonymous. Only the 
experimenter will know your identity, but your data will be treated confidentially.  
 
Rules of the game 
Now you will learn more about the rules of the game you will be participating in. Altogether 4 
players take part in the game, so besides you there are 3 more players. Each player has an 
initial endowment of 20 points. Your task in the game, and also your fellow players’ task, is 
to decide how many points you would like to contribute to a joint project. Your contribution, 
q, can be set between 0 and 20 points. 
Your individual and also your fellow players’ payout will be calculated as follows: 
Your payout = (20 − your contribution to the project) + b (sum of all contributions of all 
players to the project) 
The parameter b is b = 0.3 for two players (in the following called “low-type”) and b = 0.7 for 
the remaining two players (in the following called “high-type”). There will be a random 
selection whether you are a low-type or a high-type.  
Assuming you to be a low-type: Your payout (in LD) will be calculated as follows: 
Payout = (20 – your contribution to the project) + 0.3·(sum of all contributions of all players 
to the project) 
That is, if for example all other players have contributed altogether 60 points to the project 
and your contribution is 20, then your payment will be: 
Payout = (20 – 20) + 0.3·(60 + 20) = 24 
If, however, all other players have contributed a total amount of 60 points and you do not 
contribute anything, your payout will be: 
Payout = (20 – 0) + 0,3·(60 + 0) = 38 
If you are a high-type, then your payout (in LD) will be calculated as follows: 
29 
 
Payout = (20 – your contribution to the project) + 0.7·(sum of all contributions of all players 
to the project) 
The information, whether you are a low-or a high-Type will be displayed on your screen. 
 
There are two stages in this game. In stage 1 you decide on the minimum contribution, 
Qmin,  that should be contributed to the joint project by the group as a whole. Simultaneously, 
all other players make their suggestions on a group minimum contribution level, Qmin. The 
minimum of the suggested levels, min(Qmin), is then decisive for contributions in the second 
stage. In stage 2 you decide on your contribution, q, to the joint project, thereby keeping in 
mind that for each player an individual minimum contribution level, qmin, will be calculated 
from min(Qmin). The implementation of these individual minimum contributions, qmin, yields 
to equal payoffs for all players or payoffs will at least be harmonized as far as possible if a 
player faces qmin = 20.  
Example: If the group minimum contribution level is Qmin = 40, low-type players are bounded 
to an individual minimum contribution of qmin = 2 and high-type agents face qmin = 18. 
Assuming these contribution levels, the payoff for each player would be 30 LD. If, however, 
Qmin= 60, minimum contribution for high-types is qmin = 20 and for low-types qmin = 10. The 
payoff for a high-type subject would be 42 LD and for a low-type subject would amount 28 
LD. 
 
The game consists of 10 separate rounds in each of which you will play the same two-stage 
game remaining the same type. The three other players you will interact with will be the same 
in every round. In each round you will receive information on suggestions on group minimum 
contribution levels (Qmin1 to Qmin4), individual contributions (q1 to q4), payoffs (Payoff1 to 
Payoff4) for all your group members and average levels (D). 
If the experiment is complete you will receive the payout of one of the rounds in € 
(according to the conversion rate stated above). The round to be paid out will be determined 
randomly. This means you should behave in each round as if it were the round relevant for 
payout. In the beginning, two trial rounds will be played which are not relevant for payout. 
 
Control questions 
If you have read the instructions and do not have any questions, please answer the following 
control questions (hint: use the simulator). 
 
1. Please assume that calculating individual minimum contribution levels, qmin, leads to 2 for 
each of the two low-type players and to 18 for the two high-type players respectively. 
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Please indicate the range of your possible contribution levels to the joint project if you are 
a low-type. 
More than _____ and less than or equal _____ 
 
2. Please assume that your contribution as a low-type to the joint project is 10 points. The 
contributions of the three other group members are 0, 10 and 20. What is your payout? 
My payout is _______  
 
3. Please assume that your contribution as a low-type to the joint project is 0 points. The 
contribution of the three other group members is 0, 10 and 20. What is your payout? 
My payout is _______  
 
4. Please assume that all three players have contributed 20 points to the project. Which of the 
following contribution levels results in your highest payout (please check the according 
box)? 
O 0 points  O 5 points  O 10 points  O 20 points 
 
5. Please assume that all three players have contributed 20 points to the project. Which of the 
following contribution levels results in the highest payout for the group (please check the 
according box)? 
O 0 points  O 5 points  O 10 points  O 20 points 
 
If you have answered all questions, please signal us. We will then check your answers. The 
game begins when all participants in the experiment have successfully completed the test. 
Good luck in the experiment! The MaXLab-Team 
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Selected Screenshots for min-I-Q-eq treatment 
 
 
 
